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Introduction
Throughout American history, almost every generation has acquired substantially more education than its parental generation. This is no longer true. Figure 1 shows the fraction of white males with a high school diploma that went on to complete a four-year college degree (hereafter "college") for the 1920 to 1970 cohorts, which are grouped by year of birth. The fraction for the 1950 cohort was nearly twice as large as that for the 1920 cohort. However, for cohorts born after 1950, the fraction of high school graduates that completed college remained flat.
1 These trends have been documented by, among others, Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange (2008) and Goldin and Katz (2008) . In this paper, I ask the following question:
What accounts for the trend observed in college attainment of white males and, in particular, the slowdown in college attainment starting with the 1950s cohorts?
I argue that changes in the growth rate of the rental price per unit of human capital (hereafter "price growth") are crucial for generating the observed pattern of college attainment. 2 I illustrate this point with a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation. Consider the earnings (E S t ) of full-time workers of education level S at time t : E S t = w t × h S t . In this identity, h S t is the quantity of human capital for education level S ∈ {H, C} (H stands for high school and C stands for college) at time t, and w t is the price per unit of human capital at time t. Suppose individuals live for two periods and college involves sacrificing current earnings for future human capital, h 1 College attainment also remained flat for cohorts of white males born after 1970, but is not shown in Figure 1 (see Appendix A). Differently from the case of males, college attainment for females rose throughout the century, with only one brief stall during the 1950s cohorts (see Appendix A). This increase, however, was arguably part of a more secular trend in both education and labor force participation influenced by reasons beyond the scope of this paper. Although this paper deals only with the college attainment of white males, general equilibrium price effects induced by the evolving college attainment of other demographic groups and influencing the college decisions of white males are taken into account within the quantitative strategy.
2 I acknowledge that other potential explanations such as changes in idiosyncratic earnings risk, changes in the progressivity of taxation, changes in credit constraints, and changes in individuals' uncertainty about their innate ability can be important and deserve a quantitative assessment. However, I abstract from these potential alternative explanations in this article. College attainment in the United States (employed white males): fraction of individuals with a high school diploma that went on to complete a fouryear college degree. Source: IPUMS-USA. 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1.4
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Figure 2: College premium in the United States (employed white males): college-graduate lifetime earnings relative to high school-graduate lifetime earnings. Source: IPUMS-USA.
cohort.
3 The college premium corresponds to
. Assuming
is constant over time, the inequality will grow larger, which implies that more people will go to college. This would contradict Figure 1 for those born after 1950. Previous studies find the flat college attainment of those born after 1950 puzzling since the college premium has been increasing (see, among others, Card and Lemieux, 2001, and Castro and Coen-Pirani, 2013) . produces endogenous patterns of earnings growth and the college premium along with the pattern of college attainment.
My model builds on Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) . It features life-cycle human capital accumulationà la Ben-Porath (1967) and a college choice. Individuals start off with a high school degree and they differ by their innate ability and their initial human capital.
Each individual decides whether or not to acquire college education as well as the quality of his college education. Once schooling is completed, individuals join the labor market and can accumulate human capital on the job. Accumulation of human capital in college requires both time and goods (that is, college quality) as inputs, while accumulation on the job requires only time. Cohorts differ by the sequence of the rental price per unit of human capital (hereafter "price sequence") they face (a time effect) as well as by the distribution of initial human capital across individuals (a cohort effect). A decrease in price growth influences the college decision in two ways. First, it decreases the returns to human capital investment and, therefore, the returns to college. Second, it increases the opportunity cost of human capital accumulation in college relative to that on the job because of the lower relative price of time. These two effects decrease the incentives to go to college more for individuals with low innate ability. Successive cohorts born after 1950 face diminished returns to human capital investment on the job and a flat profile of returns to college quality, as the rental price of human capital grows very slowly after 1970. Third, the model generates the increase in the college premium for the 1920-1970 cohorts. The increase is generated by the slowdown in price growth and an increased dispersion of the initial human capital for successive cohorts born after 1940.
Pre-1970s price growth fuels the increase in college attainment for the cohorts 1920 to 1950, which has a significant selection effect on the average innate ability and average human capital associated with college and high school. The decline in price growth of the 1970s causes selection into college to depend more on an individual's innate ability over time. As the rental price of human capital at high school graduation increases and its growth over the lifecycle decreases, initial human capital becomes less important for the college decision; and the college decision is ruled more by an individual's innate ability. The increase in dispersion of the initial human capital for successive cohorts born after 1940 is central to the recent rise in the college premium: in its absence, the college premium increases of only 2 percent after the 1950 cohort.
A few papers study the slowdown in college attainment in the US. Gemici and Wiswall (2014) find an increase in tuitions costs discouraged college attendance for the 1950s to 1960s
cohorts. I consider an alternative formulation of my model where some college expenditures 5 might be beyond the control of individuals. I divert from the baseline by assuming individuals must pay a fixed cost to complete college and the relative price of college education is not constant over time. Despite the model fit on college attainment improves for the 1940s cohorts under this alternative formulation, the elasticity of college attainment to price growth does not change substantially. Donovan and Herrington (2013) explain the slowdown in college attainment with a version of myopic expectations on the rise of the college premium.
In an alternative exercise, I relax the assumption of perfect foresight and consider the simple scenario of individuals expecting the price growth observed at high school graduation to persist during their lifetime. The model implied timing of the slowdown in college attainment aligns with the data under this alternative scenario. Lastly, Castro and Coen-Pirani (2013) conduct a comprehensive analysis of the slowdown in college attainment by considering multiple channels. They also conclude tuitions and expectations do not hold a primary role on the flat college attainment observed for the post-1950 cohorts. However, they find a small effect of price growth on college attainment. By endogenizing human capital accumulation in college and on the job, my framework allows for price growth to influence the returns to college quality and human capital accumulation on the job along with the returns to time investment in schooling.
The papers that are the closest to mine are Restuccia and Vandenbroucke (2013) , Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) , and Guvenen and Kuruscu (2010) . Restuccia and Vandenbroucke (2013) study the rise of educational attainment and the evolution of relative earnings across education groups. I consider both the rise and the flattening in college attainment. Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) conduct a qualitative analysis of the dynamics of college attainment and earnings inequality resulting from skill-biased technical change. Guvenen and Kuruscu (2010) perform a quantitative study along the lines of Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) . Their results are consistent with the evolution of earnings inequality, the college premium, and the rise in college attainment. My paper replicates the pattern in earnings inequality, the college premium, and both the rise and the flattening of college attainment shown in the data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model and section 3
calibrates it. Section 4 details the results of the quantitative experiment. Section 5 concludes. Individuals are endowed with one unit of time that can be spent either on working or on human capital accumulation. They can accumulate human capital in college and on the job.
The college enrollment decision is made by cohorts at age 1. Individuals decide whether or not to attend college as well as the quality of their college education. After schooling is completed, human capital can be accumulated on the job by subtracting productive time to work. Human capital is homogeneous between and within schooling types. There is one price that clears the human capital market, w. The price grows exogenously at rate g t .
6 I use R to denote the gross interest rate that is exogenously given. Each cohort differs by the price sequence it faces and by the distribution of initial human capital.
4 I interpret innate ability to reflect both endowment at birth and the influence of family background up to age 19, as in Carneiro and Heckman (2002) .
5 I assume a frictionless credit market and abstract from borrowing constraint for two reasons primarily: (i) to keep the model as tractable as possible in order to investigate the role of the rental price per unit of human capital on college attainment, and (ii) in consideration of the evidence that, once family background factors are taken into account, borrowing constraints play only a minor role in the college decisions of the 1957-1965 cohorts, which are among those cohorts experiencing a stagnation in college attainment (see Carneiro and Heckman, 2002) .
6 The model is in partial equilibrium, as I study the college decision given the exogenous rental price per unit of human capital. My approach can be viewed as the reverse of Krusell, Ohanian, Ros-Rull, and Violante (2000) 's approach, who study the evolution of skill prices given exogenous college decisions.
No-college Path
Individuals who decide not to go to college join the labor market right after high school graduation at age 1. They maximize the present value of earnings over their working lifetime by dividing available time between human capital accumulation, i, and work (1 − i).
The problem for an individual of type (z, h 1 ) ∈ B, born in cohort τ , on the no-college path is given by
given h 1 .
An individual's earnings at age j, E j , equal the product of the amount of human capital accumulated up to age j, the price of human capital at age j, and the fraction of time allocated to market work at age j. 
The subscript H denotes the no-college path. The elasticity of human capital investment on the job, β H ∈ (0, 1), determines the degree of diminishing marginal returns of human capital investment. The productivity of human capital investment depends on an individual's innate ability. This specification is widely used in both the empirical literature and the human capital literature (see, for example, Mincer, 1997 and Kuruscu, 2006) . Finally, notice that nothing is lost when studying human capital accumulation decisions by abstracting from consumption and saving decisions. In particular, the focus on lifetime earnings maximization does not require the assumption of risk neutrality: any concave utility function implies the same human capital investment behavior.
I formulate the problem in the language of dynamic programming. The value function,
gives the maximum present value of earnings at age j from state h for an individual of innate ability z who faces the life-cycle price sequence w. In its recursive formulation,
For β H ∈ (0, 1) the problem is concave. Standard methods can be used to solve for the value function and the policy function for time investment in human capital i.
The first-order conditions for human capital investment and working time imply the Euler equation:
for g j = The value of the no-college path for an individual of type (z, h 1 ) ∈ B, born in cohort τ , is: 
College Path
Individuals on the college path stay in college for two periods and join the labor market at age 3. When they start college, they pick the quality of their college education. After graduation from college, they maximize the present value of earnings over their working lifetime by dividing time between work and human capital accumulation, as with the nocollege path. The problem for an individual of type (z, h 1 ) ∈ B, born in cohort τ , on the 7 I relax the assumption of perfect foresight in Section 4.1. 
A college graduate's on-the-job human capital accumulation technology differs from the nocollege case by the value of the elasticity of human capital investment, β C . I assume that college requires full-time investment, therefore earnings are zero for the first two periods for those in college. Human capital accumulation in college requires innate ability, college quality e, and human capital as inputs. Individuals who invest more on their college quality acquire more human capital while in college given their endowments. Investment in college quality represents all sorts of college expenditures, such as tuition and fees, as well as the disutility associated with putting a certain effort in learning. I assume that college quality is chosen once and for all at the beginning of college and corresponding expenditures are paid in two equal amounts each period while in college. The in-college human capital accumulation function is
Given human capital at college graduation, h 3 (h 1 , e), the on-the-job human capital accumulation problem for the college path is identical to the one for the no-college path up to the elasticity of human capital investment on the job, β C . The college quality problem can be
e, for V 3 as in eq. 1 with j = 3. The first-order conditions are
where j and a are defined as for the no-college path. The left-hand side of eq. 3 is the marginal cost of increasing college quality -that is, the present value of additional expenses derived from a marginal increase in college quality. The right-hand side of eq. 3 is the marginal benefit of increasing college quality -that is, the present discounted value of the future stream of earnings derived from a marginal increase in college quality. Individuals with higher innate ability and higher initial human capital invest more on college quality.
Both a higher initial level and a higher growth over the lifecycle of the price imply a higher optimal college quality. When the price at high school graduation increases, the return to college quality increases proportionally with it, while the cost of college quality remains unaltered. When price growth increases, the benefit of human capital accumulation on the job increases (a increases in price growth) and so does the return to college quality, while the cost of college quality remains unaltered once again.
The value of the college path for an individual of type (z, h 1 ) ∈ B, born in cohort τ , is the discounted value of lifetime earnings net of total expenditures on college quality:
where e denotes optimal college quality (from eq. 3) and b C is indexed by schooling, C, because it depends on the elasticity of on-the-job accumulation as for the no-college case.
College Decision
Individuals within a cohort choose their education level upon graduation from high school.
They do so based on their type, (z, h 1 ), and the price sequence observed during their lifetime, w. A college education is pursued if and only if
Let the indicator function 1(h 1 , z, w) take the value of 1 if an individual pursues a college education and 0 if he does not. Thus,
There are three assumed trade-offs between the college and no-college paths: (i) Human capital is not productive during college education but is when work is chosen.
(ii) The technology for human capital accumulation in college is not the same as the technology for human capital accumulation on the job. (iii) The elasticity of human capital investment on the job differs between education levels. Each of these three trade-offs shape the effect of the price sequence on the college decision. The decision rule in eq. 4 can be rewritten as
where e indicates the optimal level of college quality, as it results from eq. 3. In eq. 5, on the left-hand side are the gains of college -that is, the additional earnings received from age 3 onwards, and on the right-hand side are the costs of college -that is, total expenses on college quality and forgone earnings. By substituting the functional forms for the value function and earnings:
where, for ease of notation, the time subscript on the price is replaced by the age subscript and I focus on the case of no full-time accumulation on the job -that is, j = 1 for the nocollege path and j = 3 for the college path. Starting from the latter of the three trade-offs, higher price growth over the lifecycle implies higher returns to human capital investment on the job. When the elasticity of human capital investment on the job for the college path is at least as big as that for the no-college path, the returns to college increase as price growth increases (notice the term b
On the second trade-off, a higher rental 9 This mechanism is related to the reverse causality mechanism from anticipated TFP growth to educa-13 price per unit of human capital at high school graduation (henceforth "price level") increases the net return to college quality, where else it leaves the net return to accumulating human capital on the job unchanged. The cost and benefit of human capital accumulation on the job both increase proportionally with the price level. However, only the benefit of college quality increases with the price level (compare the pair 1/R 2 w 3 a 3 h H 3 and w 1 h 1 i 1 +1/Rw 2 h H 2 i 2 to the pair 1/R 2 w 3 a 3 h C 3 and 1 + 1 R e ). Lastly, on the first trade-off, the opportunity cost of accumulating human capital in college relative to accumulating human capital on the job decreases with higher price growth. The commitment to four-year full-time investment in human capital after high school graduation associated with college becomes relatively less burdensome as price growth increases.
Who goes to college? On average, individuals with high innate ability go to college. They are more productive learners, both in college and on the job, and therefore obtain higher returns from attending college. An individual's initial human capital also influences the college choice. Because human capital and college quality are complements in the accumulation of human capital in college, individuals with higher initial human capital face bigger returns to college quality. However, because human capital is not productive during college, individuals with lower initial human capital have a lower opportunity cost of spending four years in college (lower forgone earnings). Notice that the importance of the margin associated with initial human capital in the college decision depends on the lifetime price sequence. As the price level increases and its growth over the lifecycle decreases, initial human capital becomes less and less important in the college decision; and the college decision is ruled more and more by an individual's innate ability.
The fraction of cohort τ acquiring a college education is determined from the cumulative distribution of initial endowments Γ τ (z, h 1 ):
Calibration
The quantitative strategy consists of setting the model in line with the path of unconditional earnings for the 1884-1970 cohorts and then exploring the model implications for educationtional attainment in Bils and Klenow (2000) . See Appendix A for full descriptions of each data set and further details on sample selection.
Deep parameters
I assume parameter values for which the literature provides evidence. The parameters that I calibrate without solving the model are reported in Table 1 together with the assigned values.
I set the gross interest rate R to 1.04 (annual rate). Estimates of the elasticity of human capital investment on the job in the literature typically vary from 0.5 to almost 0.95 (see Browning, Hansen, and Heckman, 1999) . My specification of the on-the-job accumulation function is a particular case of Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) . 10 These authors provide estimates of the elasticity of on-the-job human capital investment at two education levels: high school and four-year college or more. I set β H = 0.832 and β C = 0.871. I set the depreciation rate, δ − 1, to zero to be consistent with Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) . Rupert and Zanella (2012) show that the declining portion of the earnings profile is mainly a result of a decreased labor supply rather than decreased hourly wage.
I calibrate the distribution of initial endowments, the in-college human capital accumulation function and the rental price of human capital in year 1980 to the age variation of unconditional earnings moments, college expenses, college attainment, and college premium for the 1961 to 1964 cohorts. I assume that the distribution of initial endowments, Γ τ , is jointly log-normal. 11 This class of distributions is characterized by 5 parameters, {µ log (z) , µ log (h 1 ) , σ log (z) , σ log (h 1 ) , ρ}. Thus, the list of parameters that are calibrated within the model are 10 The human capital accumulation function in Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) is zi η S h β S for S ∈ {C, H}. They work with four ability types and two education levels (high school and 4 years of college or more) and estimate the human capital accumulation function with NLSY79 data on white-male earnings for the period 1979-1993.
11 Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2006) show that, in this set-up, in terms of replicating life-cycle earnings dynamics, the gains of going from a parametric to a non-parametric approach for the distribution of initial endowments are not substantial. 14 The model is consistent with a faster rise in the dispersion of earnings over the lifecycle for college graduates relative 14 One extension of the model carrying the necessary degrees of freedom to match earnings growth for both high school graduates and college graduates features education-specific prices of human capital, i.e., a price for high school human capital and a price for college human capital. I am not pursuing this extension because (i) of the parsimony of the single-price model, (ii) the single price model performs quite well on educationspecific earnings moments, and (iii) in the single price model, education-specific earnings moments can be used as a metric of the merit of the model.
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to that for high school graduates. This is because college graduates have larger mean and larger dispersion of innate ability than high school graduates and the incentives to human capital accumulation increase more than proportionally with an individual's innate ability. Finally, the model under-estimates the growth of the coefficient of variation of earnings over the lifecycle for both education groups and over-estimates its differential between college and high school graduates of 10 percentage points. To further check the model implications on life-cycle earnings inequality, I consider the performance of the model on an additional moment: the asymmetry of the earnings distribution measured by the ratio of median to mean earnings. The model generates life-cycle patterns of the asymmetry of the earnings distribution close to the data. Right skewness follows because incentives for human capital investment increase more than proportionally with an individual's innate ability (see eq. 7
and recall that β < 1). The positive association of innate ability with college is the reason for: (i) a higher average life-cycle skewness of college graduate earnings relative to that of high school graduate earnings and (ii) a higher rise in the skewness of college graduate earnings over the lifecycle relative to that of high school graduate earnings.
Cohort-specific parameters
Cohorts exogenously differ by two dimensions: they face different life-cycle price sequences (a time effect) and they face different distributions of initial human capital across individuals (a cohort effect).
15 I calibrate time and cohort effects to replicate the evolution of unconditional earnings moments, first and second moments, for the 1884 to 1970 cohorts.
The price sequence is identified with data on life-cycle earnings growth for successive cohorts.
Consider mean earnings of individuals in cohort τ at age j E τ j = wτ +2(j−1)hτ j
. Lifecycle earnings growth for cohort τ is measured 15 The distribution of innate ability is assumed to stay constant across cohorts. This is possibly a restrictive assumption for the cohorts born between 1920 and 1940 considering the substantial expansion in high school education that happened during this period. Within the framework of this paper, exogenous changes in the distribution of innate ability of high school graduates cannot be separately identified from those in the distribution of human capital of high school graduates due to data restrictions.
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by the change in mean earnings between age j and j > j:
where res 1 (·) is a residual arising from human capital accumulation, g w is price growth, g µ is growth in mean initial human capital, and g σ is growth in the standard deviation of initial human capital. I am assuming these three growth rates to be constant for ease of exposure;
This assumption is dropped in the actual calibration exercise. If there is no human capital accumulation on the job, lifecycle earnings growth equals 1 + g w and perfectly identifies price growth. As the age at which life-cycle earnings growth is measured increases, the benefits of human capital accumulation decrease, and life-cycle earnings growth more closely mimics price growth (see Appendix C for further details). Therefore, I use life-cycle earnings growth late in the lifecycle for the 1884 to 1958 cohorts to discipline price growth ( Figure 6 , panel (c), solid lines). This methodology for recovering price growth was originally proposed by Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) and more recently used by Bowlus and Robinson (2012) to measure the prices of human capital across various education levels.
The evolution of the distribution of initial human capital is identified with data on mean and dispersion of cross-sectional earnings over successive years. Cross-sectional earnings growth at age j is measured by the change in average earnings between j-year olds in cohort τ and j-year olds in cohort τ :
where res 2 (·) is a residual arising from human capital accumulation. If there is no human capital accumulation on the job and college augments an individual's initial human capital of ∆, cross-sectional earnings growth equals (1+g
identifies changes in average initial human capital given g w and a path of college attainment.
Earnings dispersion is measured by the coefficient of variation of earnings. Thus, growth of cross-sectional earnings dispersion at age j is measured by the change in earnings dispersion between j-year olds in cohort τ and j-year olds in cohort τ :
where σh The age group in targets 2 and 3 is chosen to match the age group at which the college premium is measured, since the evolution of the distribution of initial human capital is a key determinant of the path of the college premium. • for price growth: 1970, 1979] • for the distribution of initial human capital:
where x = {µ, σ} and τ indicates the year of birth of the cohort.
There is a total of 6 targets for 6 unkowns. Formally, the calibration strategy consists of solving a system of 6 equations in 6 unknowns. For a given Γ = {g 1,x , g 2,x } x={w,µ,σ} , I compute the model moments, X(Γ), that correspond to the targets described above. I then solve for the zero of the function F (Γ) defined by
whereX are the targets described above.
I simulate the earnings and schooling path for 100,000 individuals in the 1884-1970 cohorts. Cross-sectional growth 2.71% -0.25% 2.74% -0.23% Cross-sectional growth of dispersion -2.00% 0.86% -2.03% 0.91% Life-cycle growth 1.79% -0.07% 1.77% -0.07% Table 5 : Model fit. Earnings: life-cycle growth, cross-sectional growth, and growth of crosssectional dispersion. The column Grw 1 indicates the average growth rate for the pre-1970s period for cross-sectional data and for the pre-1939 cohorts for life-cycle data. The column Grw 2 indicates the average growth rate for the post-1970s period for cross-sectional data and for the for the post-1939 cohorts for life-cycle data.
rates. What is the significance of a change in the distribution of initial human capital over cohorts? An individual's human capital is the amount of knowledge he possesses. Hence, the distribution of initial human capital is a measure of the "quality" of the high school graduates. The calibration implies an increase in the average "quality" of successive cohorts of high school graduates followed by a decline. 17 This pattern is consistent with anecdotal evidence presented by Taubman and Wales (1972) and Bishop (1989) on cognitive skills of high school graduates. Taubman and Wales (1972) observe that test scores of high school graduates decline starting with the late-1920s cohorts, after increasing from the beginning of the century. Bishop (1989) 17 An evident reason for the decline in the quality of successive cohorts of high school graduates is the expansion in high school education that happened between the 1920 and the 1940 cohorts. Among those born in 1920, the fraction of white males with at least a high school diploma was 57 percent. This fraction was 82 percent for those born in 1940. A positive correlation between schooling and innate ability and/or human capital, as it transpires from evidence on tests scores, implies that large changes in high school attainment can potentially have a significant selection effect on the average innate ability and average human capital associated with high school education.
Results
The main results of the paper are in terms of college attainment and college premium. In this section, I present the model implications for the patterns of college attainment and college premium for the 1920-1970 cohorts and I investigate the quantitative contribution of changes in the rental price per unit of human capital along with changes in the distribution of initial human capital to those patterns.
College attainment of the 1920-1970 cohorts is shown in Figure 13a and summarized in Table   6 The increase in the college premium is generated by a combination of both exogenous forces in the model: the time effect and the cohort effect. Figure 9 shows a decomposition exercise of these two effects on the pattern of the college premium. In a first experiment ("Time effect only"), I keep the initial human capital distribution of each cohort to be the same, so that the only difference between cohorts is the life-cycle price sequence. The resulting college premium increases almost exclusively during the 1920s cohorts. In particular, the cohorts, lessening the increase in the college premium that would have otherwise resulted from the time effect. The contemporaneous increase in the mean of initial human capital strengthens this effect only slightly. Symmetrically, the dispersion of initial human capital increases commencing with the 1940s cohorts, fueling the rise in the college premium.
The time effect influences the pattern of the college premium along with the cohort effect. A composition effect is at play. Price growth determines college attainment and so the average innate ability and average initial human capital of college graduates and high school graduates. Innate ability and initial human capital determine human capital investment and so the college premium, which is the ratio of the median human capital supplied to market work by college graduates relative to that supplied by high school graduates. Pre-1970s price growth fuels the increase in college attainment, which has a significant selection effect on the average innate ability and average initial human capital associated with a schooling level and exert a predominant role in the increase in the college premium during the cohorts 1920s to 1940s. Previous studies, such as Hendricks and Schoellman (2014) and Laitner (2000) 30 1920 positive sorting by innate ability across schooling levels. The initial human capital margin does not matter for the college decision of the more recent cohorts of high school graduates, while it matters for the less-recent cohorts along with the innate ability margin. The reason is that the two sets of cohorts face differently shaped life-cycle sequences of the price. The 1930s cohorts face low price of human capital at high school graduation and high price growth over the life-cycle. On the other hand, the 1960s cohorts face high price of human capital at high school graduation and low price growth over the lifecycle. There is no direct measure of such a change in college selection over time in the data. However, Taubman and Wales (1972) , Bowen and Turner (1999) , and Gemici and Wiswall (2014) unit of human capital has both an intensive-and an extensive-margin effect on the average innate ability associated with college and so on the college premium. 
Discussion
The College Board (2007)'s data on average tuition and fees for private and public colleges as a group are available from academic year 1967 -1977 onwards. For academic year preceding 1967 -1977 measure college expenses as a weighted average between average tuitions and fees in private colleges and average tuitions and fees in public colleges. The weight is chosen so that college expenses for academic year 1967-1977 match the data on average tuition and fees for private and public colleges as a group. 
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Second, I recalibrate the model parameters to deliver the targets of the baseline calibration with the exception of cross-cohort life-cycle earnings growth, which was previously used to discipline price growth. Figure 13 and Table 7 , column "Model/Alt 4", show the implied pattern of college attainment and college premium. Consistent with the baseline exercise, college attainment in the alternative exercise slows down starting with the 1940s cohort.
The college premium in the alternative exercise follows the baseline very closely, with the exception of the 1920-1930s cohorts for which it better aligns with the data.
Conclusion
In this paper I assess the quantitative importance of the growth rate of the rental price per unit of human capital in generating patterns of US college attainment for white males born between 1920 and 1970. I argue that price growth is a key factor in the pattern of college attainment. In particular, a decrease in price growth in the 1970s causes college attainment to remain flat for the cohorts born after 1950 in the US.
Since earnings reflect both the quantity and the price of human capital, the rental price per unit of human capital is not observable. I write a model of human capital accumulation in college and on the job to identify the rental price per unit of human capital and to quantify its importance for the path of college attainment. I calibrate the model to major patterns of earnings growth and earnings inequality, both across time and over the lifecycle, for the 1920-1970 cohorts. The calibration implies a decrease in price growth starting in the 1970s. As price growth decreases, the returns to human capital investment decrease and the opportunity cost of human capital accumulation in college increases relative to that on the job. Hence, college attainment flattens.
22 Because of the structure imposed on price growth, in particular the choice of ω, price growth between 1970 and 1980 also matches Bowlus and Robinson (2012) estimates for the period. See section 3.2.
One short coming of the model is that it generates a slowdown in college attainment that starts earlier than in the data. In an alternative exercise, I show that individual expectations influence the timing of the slowdown in college attainment. When I assume individuals expect price growth observed at high school graduation to persist during their lifetime, the model replicates the timing of the slowdown in college attainment as shown in the data. However, I only scratch the surface of the potential role of individuals' expectations on the timing of the slowdown in college attainment.
The slowdown in college attainment is part of a wider phenomenon that involves all levels of education (see Appendix A). For example, Heckman and LaFontaine (2010) report a flattening of high school graduation rates. As Castro and Coen-Pirani (2013) point out, the observation that the slowdown in attainment spreads across all levels of education simultaneously, supports the idea of a common factor behind such slowdown. The mechanism I consider produces symmetric implications across schooling groups and, therefore, is qualitatively consistent with a general flattening of educational attainment. It would be interesting to extend the quantitative analysis in this paper to include levels of education beyond a four-year college degree. 
B Model Derivations
On-the-job human capital accumulation. If an agent of type (z, h 1 ) never returns to full-time investment once he stops full-time investment, the on-the-job accumulation problem has a closed form solution. This condition is satisfied if (i) δ ∈ (0, 1], and (ii) price growth does not increase "too much" over the lifecycle. The analytical solution of the on-the-job accumulation problem is as follows:
where h * j is the cutoff level of human capital at age j under which the individual spends all his time on human capital accumulation. The recursive formulation of the two constants is: The LHS of eq. 6 is decreasing in e and the RHS of eq. 6 is a constant greater than zero for η ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, it is true that: for a as defined in Appendix B. Average innate ability influences the slope of the earnings profile. Agents with higher innate ability allocate more time to human capital accumulation and so have low initial earnings. Later in life, their earnings are higher following higher human capital investment (in college and on the job). The level of initial human capital influences the intercept of an individual's earnings profile and its concavity. The coefficients of variation of innate ability and initial human capital influence the life-cycle dynamics of earnings dispersion. A lower dispersion in innate ability implies a lower increase in the coefficient of variation of earnings over the lifecycle. When all agents are born with equal innate ability but different initial human capital levels, the model generates a pattern of decreasing earnings dispersion over the lifecycle through human capital accumulation. Dispersion in initial human capital determines the concavity of the life-cycle profile of earnings dispersion. The correlation of innate ability and initial human capital disciplines how the two dimensions of heterogeneity come together to shape life-cycle earnings dynamics. The college premium helps in the identification of the dispersion of initial human capital and the correlation between innate ability and initial human capital.
C.2 Cohort-specific parameters
Identification: price growth. When investment in human capital is negligible:
E j = wτ +2(j−1) h j − wτ +2(j−1) i j h j wτ +2(j−1) h j , E j+1 = wτ +2(j) h j − wτ +2(j) i j+1 h j wτ +2(j) h j , and therefore g w,τ +2(j−1) g E j .
